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AUTHORITY
OAG, D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

*DDC Cameron*

DAAG-PAP-A(M) (17 Jan 72) DAFD-OTT 711054 711055 27 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Hqs. 63rd Signal Bn,  
37th Signal Bn, Period Ending 30 April 1971

*2*

SEE DISTRIBUTION

AD 890985

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

- 2 Incl
1. DAFD-OTT 711054
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(Continued on page 2)

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AD NO.   
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*24*

SCCPV-PG-IN-OP

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th  
Signal Battalion (Spt), Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS  
CSFOR (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Requirements for qualified personnel in MOS 05C, 72B, 76Y, and 26L.

(a) Observation: This battalion has an ever increasing requirement for personnel in the above listed MOS's, due to the massive communications responsibility that has been assigned.

(b) Evaluation: As this battalion takes over responsibility for departing units, the required number of replacement personnel in the above mentioned MOS's are not presently being assigned.

(c) Recommendation: That higher headquarters re-evaluate the mission and personnel requirement for this battalion.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has recently submitted a BADS document and a T&ADS update. These documents reflect the need for additional qualified personnel.

(2) Hai Van Pass Radio Site:

(a) Observation: Manning of the Hai Van Pass Signal Site.

(b) Evaluation: In order to properly man the Hai Van Pass Site, personnel other than MOS 52B are needed. A 52B generator mechanic and personnel with combat type MOS are needed to insure proper site security, without stripping the operating sections of necessary personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That this battalion be authorized filler personnel other than school trained MOS's, preferably a combat type MOS.

(d) Command Action: Site personnel supplemented by excess MOS personnel.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Testing of back-up equipment.

(a) Observation: It is the experience of this battalion that daily testing of back-up equipment is mandatory because of extreme weather conditions.

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711055  
Incl 2

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SCCPV-PG-PB-OP

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63rd Signal  
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation.

a. Personnel

(1) Transferring Personnel in Connection with Drawdowns.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel have been transferred to this battalion from units drawing down without important documents in their personnel file.

(b) EVALUATION: Commanders of units undergoing deactivation or redeployment should forward to the gaining unit any records of counselling statements. In those cases where personnel are possible candidates for elimination under AR 635-212, reassignment orders should include the statement "for rehabilitative transfer. This will provide the gaining commander with an established record on the man so he can take prompt and appropriate action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders forward counselling statements and other records of disciplinary problems whenever a man is transferred to a new unit.

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Incl 1

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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63rd Signal Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (73)

(b) **EVALUATION:** Upon investigation, it was discovered that a TH-5 superimposes an alternating current ripple and adds distortion to the output signal of the Mode V. The low level signaling of the Mode V is particularly susceptible to path problems. The transistorized TH-22 does not distort the Mode V output.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the TH-22 always be used in place of the TH-5 on Mode V circuits.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

(1) Training for Contingency Teams.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Contingency teams and contingency equipment have been sent on missions as separate packages.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The operators on a contingency team should be familiar with the particular equipment they will operate on a mission. In this way they can assure that all pieces are ready. Practice exercises should be conducted periodically to develop teamwork and confidence in the equipment.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That contingency teams and equipment always come from the same unit and that practice exercises be held as often as possible.

(2) Training is Required in Preparing Equipment for Airlift.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Serviceable equipment that was airlifted to a new site frequently arrived in an unserviceable condition.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Most operators have not received specific training on preparing and rigging signal shelters and equipment for airlift. Since air-mobile operations will continue for the indefinite future, operators should have some practice and instruction in preparing signal vans for airlift.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That operators receive both school and OJT training in preparing signal shelters and equipment for airlift.

f. Logistics.

(1) PLL Supply Cannot Meet Sudden Requirements.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Unit PLL's could not meet requirements for repair parts when unit was suddenly deployed to the field.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The PLL system to keep adequate repair parts on hand is based on recent demands for repair parts. If a unit is tasked on short

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63rd Signal Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

notice to go to the field from an installation environment, the PLL will not be able to sustain the increased repair parts demand.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That AMC develop lists of deadlining repair parts that are known to require periodic replacement under field conditions. It is further recommended teams be authorized a special PLL of these items. These items should remain with the contingency assets.

(2) Maintaining Accountability of Property during Field Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During Operation Lam Son 719, new equipment was received and sent directly to the field by operations sections.

(b) EVALUATION: Once equipment leaves the relatively secure staging areas, it is extremely difficult to establish and maintain property accountability. When equipment is to be moved, those responsible for property accountability should be notified immediately so that proper accountability can be maintained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That operations personnel notify logistics personnel at the unit and battalion level when equipment is moved into or out of a unit's area of operation.

(3) Hand Receipt of Property from 1st Signal Brigade Unit to MACV Unit.

(a) OBSERVATION: During Operation Lam Son 719, many pieces of equipment were passed to MACV units on hand receipts. It was extremely difficult to retrieve this property once the operation ended.

(b) EVALUATION: There was no way to keep track of the property or the consignee during the operation. The property book officer must have some way of controlling his property under such circumstances.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That 1st Signal Brigade teams be attached to MACV units to operate and maintain the equipment and to retain control over the property of the Brigade unit.

(4) Keeping Expendable But Mission-Essential Items with Signal Vans.

(a) OBSERVATION: When signal shelters such as AN/MRC-69's, AN/MRC-54's, and AN/MCC-6's are moved from one site to another, the vans become unserviceable because expendable, but nevertheless mission-essential, equipment is lost.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63rd Signal Battalion. Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFG-65 (R3)

(b) **EVALUATION:** During relocations, items such as ground rods are left behind because they are difficult to extract from the earth. Power cables, ground rods, and antenna coaxial cable are frequently misplaced or borrowed and never returned. Small items such as antenna components and cable are lost.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That PLL's of using units include as a minimum one spare antenna coaxial cable, one power cable, and one ground rod for each van or stack of equipment. When the PLL item is used, a replacement can be ordered immediately.

(5) Replacement of Tube 3CX100A5 in R-878/GRC-147.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The receiver R-878/GRC-147 uses a tube with a specially designed heat sink. The tube with this special heat sink is not a military standard item. A tube MIL 7289 must be ordered and then modified at the direct support maintenance facility. This tube comes with two different style heat sinks, only one of which can be easily modified to serve as a repair part.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Some MIL 7289 tubes come with a heat sink that is held in place by a set of screws. On these, it is simple to remove the heat sink and replace it with the specially designed heat sink. The other version of the MIL 7289 tube is threaded and has a screw-on heat sink. It is impossible to put the specially designed heat sink on this version of the tube.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the two versions of the tube MIL 7289 be listed by different military standard numbers and different Federal Stock Numbers.

(6) Accountability of COMSEC Equipment.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During Operation Lam Son 719, it was made apparent that command control is just as essential for accountability of COMSEC equipment as it is for other signal equipment.

(b) **EVALUATION:** 1st Signal Brigade battalions have been tasked in USARV Regulation 330-21 to provide MACV and non-divisional units with COMSEC equipment. During Operation Lam Son 719 it was impossible to exercise any control over the MACV and Ranger personnel that signed hand receipts for COMSEC equipment. Hand receipt holders can leave RVN without the COMSEC custodian's knowledge or approval. COMSEC equipment can be missing for extensive periods of time without being reported because the hand receipt holder is not under the control of the commander who has responsibility for the COMSEC account.

6  
NOT REPRODUCIBLE

SCCPV-PG-OP

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 3rd Signal Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)


(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That accountability for COMSEC equipment in Vietnam follow command channels. Each unit that has a continuing need for COMSEC equipment should establish its own account with COMSEC Logistics Support Center, Vietnam. COMSEC Logistics Support Sections should be established in each military region to provide area COMSEC support for MACV Teams and non-divisional units.

g. Communications. None.

h. Material. None.

i. Other. None.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey: (Omitted unless specifically required by direction of DA as outlined in para 8e(3) AR 525-15).



THOMAS C. NELSON  
LTC, SIGC  
Commanding

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- 3 cy - Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHDC-DC, APO 96375
- 1 cy - Commanding General, USASTRATCOM-PAC, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, APO 96557
- 10cy - Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, (USASTRATCOM), ATTN: SCCPV-OP, APO 96348
- 6 cy - Commanding Officer, 12th Signal Group, ATTN: SCCPV-PG-OP, APO 96349

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
SCCPV-IG-OP (13 May 1971) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 63rd  
Signal Battalion Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCSCS  
FOR-65(R-3)

DA, Headquarters, 12th Signal Group, APO 96349, 20 May 1971.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington D. C. 20310

Commanding General  
1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)  
ATTN: SCCPV-OP  
APO 96384

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15, and 1st Signal Brigade Supplement 1 to AR 525-15, 15 March 1971.
2. This Headquarters has reviewed the report and concurs with the following comments and or exceptions: Paragraph and subparagraph titles should not be underlined. Subparagraph (d), Command Action, should be included in all Lessons Learned as changed by AR 525-15, 20 November, 1970.

  
PHILLIP E. LOWRY  
COL SigC  
Commanding

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SCCPV-OP-CC (13 May 71) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63d Signal  
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, HQ, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384 JUN 20 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the report and concurs in it as  
indorsed with the following comments:

a. Reference pg. 1, para 1.a. line 1, should read: "On 10 November  
1970, the ...."


b. Reference item, "Training for Contingency Teams", pg. 9, para  
2.e.(1)(c). The 1st Signal Brigade Policy is that contingency equipment and  
personnel to man the equipment will come from the same unit. However, due  
to the magnitude of the recent Lam Son 719 operation, the Brigade was forced  
to depart from this policy. The rapid increase in systems and communications  
equipment installed made it impossible for trained contingency teams to  
accompany the equipment to the site where it was to be operated in all in-  
stances.

c. Reference item, "PLL Supply Cannot Meet Sudden Requirements", pg.  
9-10, para 2.f.(1)(c). Non-concur. A properly maintained PLL should sustain  
the operation.

d. Reference item, "Keeping Expendable But Mission-Essential Items with  
Signal Vans", pg. 10-11, para 2.f.(4)(c). Non-concur. The problem as stated  
is non PLL related and stems from lack of adequate supervision during relo-  
cations of subject equipment.

e. Reference item, "Replacement of Tube 3CX100A5 in R-878/GRC-147",  
pg. 11, para 2.f.(5)(c). Non-concur with that portion recommending a diffe-  
rent Military Standard Designator. Military Standard Designators are used to  
indicate operating parameters and not a difference in size or shape.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
D. H. BURRIER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CF:

Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command,  
ATTN: SCC-OPS-RT, Ft Huachuca, Arizona 85613  
Commanding Officer, 12th Signal Group, APO 96349  
Commanding Officer, 63d Signal Battalion, APO 96308

AVHDO-DO (15 May 71) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 37th Signal Battalion  
(Spt) Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 26 AUG 1971

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications  
Command-Pacific, APO 96557

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 37th Signal  
Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



T.L. CHILDRESS

CPT AGC

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:  
37th Sig Bn  
1st Sig Bde

SCCP-OP-OOE (13 May 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63d Signal  
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)


Headquarters, US Army Strategic Communications Command-Pacific, APO  
San Francisco 96557 24 AUG 1971

THRU: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-  
FD, APO 96558  
Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications Command,  
ATTN: SCC-PO-CEFF, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ANN M. RIOU  
CPT, WAC  
Acting Asst AG

CF:

CG, USARV, APO 96375  
CG, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384  
CO, 12th Sig Gp (USASTRATCOM), APO 96349  
CO, 63d Sig Bn (USASTRATCOM), APO 96308

GPOP-FD (13 May 71) 5th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 63d  
Signal Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 88 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-2A), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mah*

M. L. MAH  
RLT, AGC  
Asst AG

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Spt), Period ending 30 April 1971, ROS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(b) Evaluation: Whenever a piece of equipment (generator, electrical, communications, etc) is picked up from a maintenance facility, it should be tested on arrival, on site, to insure its performance capability. The extreme dust in this area makes daily cleaning of air conditioner filters, air cleaners on generators, and motor vehicles a mandatory requirement. The need for daily testing of back-up equipment is due to extreme dust and moisture conditions which can deadline a piece of equipment, even though not in use.

(c) Recommendation: That a program of daily PM, and SOP for daily testing of back-up equipment be initiated for all sites operated by the 37th Signal Battalion.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has implemented a program that consists of testing equipment when returned from maintenance before it is put into use, and sites have been instructed to test daily, all items of back-up equipment, to insure their performance capability.

(2) Care of Generators:

(a) Observations: The daily care and maintenance of power generators is important to the accomplishment of a units mission.

(b) Evaluation: Some reasons for deadlined generators are the cause of faulty maintenance and starting procedures.

(c) Recommendations: That diesel generators be idled for a period of 60 seconds before running up to operating speed. This will cause the oil pressure to build up and distribute oil to all the parts that move rapidly as RPM's are increased. That radiator shutters be closed during operation. That pre-operation checks be implemented to insure all fuel line connections are tight and coolants are at the proper level. That generators be tested under load on a daily basis. Further recommend that 10-KW generators not be used in a configuration where they would have to be operated for great periods of time. It has been found that they will not stand up to the extreme heat, humidity, and dust of Vietnam. 10-KW generators were not designed for this, and its RPM is too high for extended use.

(d) Command Action: Starting procedures and generator operating procedures are posted at each site and on each generator. All shutters have "CLOSE DURING OPERATION" posted on them.

(3) Proper use of AN/GRC-106:

(a) Observations: It is noted that many of the most important operating rules are being overlooked.

(b) Evaluation: Many times, the appropriate antenna is not used, and many times they are not being properly connected. When tuning the amplifier AM-3349, never tune the set after switching to operate, and never switch to operate until the set has been tuned.

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(2) Attaching Personnel for Specific Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel were attached to this battalion for Operation Lam Son 719. Many reported with very limited time until DEROS, R&R or 14 day leave.

(b) EVALUATION: The attachment of personnel with short periods of time remaining until departure results in unnecessary replacement of personnel during critical operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the headquarters that tasks units to attach personnel to another unit require those units to attach only those personnel with enough time to complete the operation.

(3) Forwarding Mail to Attached Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some personnel attached to this battalion during Operation Lam Son 719 never received their mail.

(b) EVALUATION: Some attached personnel received their mail in an orderly manner indicating that present procedures prescribed by Army Regulations for forwarding mail are adequate. Some personnel did not receive mail because unit did not forward mail IAW the AR.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units adhere to AR to insure that personnel receive their mail.

b. Intelligence. None

c. Operations.

(1) Building Bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION: In a recent operation, signal vans had to be removed from bunkers at a semi-fixed site. Four hundred man-hours were required to extract four signal vans from a bunker complex.

(b) EVALUATION: Site planners must always consider the fact that equipment may be required on short notice, bunkers should be constructed in a manner that permits easy extraction of the vans.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That standard plans be developed for construction of bunkers such that signal equipment can be easily extracted.

(2) Reducing Reject Rate on Mode V AUTODIN Circuit.

(a) OBSERVATION: A COMCEN experienced a high "false" reject rate on a Mode V circuit for over a month.

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CSFOR-65 (R3)

(c) Recommendations: It is imperative that only trained personnel perform repairs on the set because of the complex circuitry and critical adjustments that have to be made.

(d) Command Actions: Increased emphasis has been placed on the training of operators, but this is being severely hampered because of the shortage of qualified O5C's. All repair work is performed by the Battalion Electronic Maintenance Shop.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics:

(1) Coordination with Direct Support Units (DSU):

(a) Observations: Unit commanders were not constantly aware of the current status of their equipment in maintenance facilities. Equipment frequently was repaired and not picked up, simply because the DSU did not call the unit, and the unit did not check.

(b) Evaluation: Units were not calling and visiting DSU often enough.

(c) Recommendations: That unit commanders establish personal liaison with DSU shop officers, and that unit maintenance personnel visit the DSU at least four times weekly.

(d) Command Actions: The Battalion Commander directed that Company Commanders visit the DSU shop officers and commanders, and emphasis was placed on the importance of frequent visits to the DSU by unit maintenance personnel.

(2) Generator and Air Conditioner failures:

(a) Observation: Numerous generator and air conditioner failures were attributed to the failure of site personnel to perform operator and organizational maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: Companies were not performing organizational and operator maintenance, and battalion maintenance personnel were not checking equipment on site often enough.

(c) Recommendation: That at least once weekly, a battalion generator repairman and air conditioner repairman make a trip to each site to check the equipment thoroughly.

(d) Command Actions: New operator and organizational maintenance SOP's have been implemented by all units, and battalion generator and air conditioner repairmen make weekly trips to all outlying sites.

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Signal Battalion (Spt), Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS  
CSFOR-65 (R3)

(3) Inactivation of Signal Sites (US&RV Drawdown):

(a) Observations: The inactivation of the 62nd Signal Company was not accomplished as smoothly as it could have. The procedure of closing out the property book proved to be very lengthy.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel at the unit were not knowledgeable in the procedures to be followed in the inactivation of a unit.

(c) Recommendations: That each time a unit is to be inactivated, a Battalion Project Officer be appointed to direct the operation. That the Project Officer be briefed by higher headquarters to insure he is informed of the correct procedures.

(d) Command Action: Recommendations are to be implemented; coordination is to be made with higher headquarters to assure the Project Officer assigned is briefed on all procedures. The Property Book Officer concerned will also receive this briefing so as to best accomplish the task.

(4) Deteriorated condition of TRC-29 and TCC-13 equipments:

(a) Observations: The brittle wiring of the outdated and obsolete circuitry used in existing TRC-29 and TCC-13 sets in this battalion have contributed to many extended outages. This equipment was manufactured in the 1940's.

(b) Evaluation: The wiring is so old and brittle, and the sets are so outdated, repair work is severely hampered. Parts are extremely difficult to obtain through supply channels, because of their excessive age.

(c) Recommendation: That the existing equipment be replaced with TRC-111 and TCC-62 vans.

(d) Command Action: Much attention has been directed to higher headquarters that this problem exists. All 12th Signal Group and 1st Signal Brigade Quality Assurance Teams concur on this fact. At present, we are training personnel on the operation, repair, and trouble-shooting of the TRC-29 and TCC-13, in order to compensate for the sub-standard equipment.

g. Communications: None

h. Material:

(1) Short supply of expendable supplies:

(a) Observations: Certain constantly used expendable items, such as teletype paper and tape, were in very short supply for the reporting period.

SCCPV-PG-DN-OP

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th  
Signal Battalion (Spt), Period ending 30 April 1971, KCS  
CSFOR-65 (R3)

(b) Evaluation: Units were not keeping a steady stream of demands for subject items going to the DSU.

(c) Recommendations: That units requisition these type supplies frequently, in small quantities, thus building up the number of demands placed against the DSU, which will in turn bring a continuous supply of the items into the command.

(d) Command Actions: All units have been directed to implement procedures to requisition frequently used items more often, in smaller quantities.

1. Other: None.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information: Omitted.  
Not requested by Headquarters, Department of the Army.

  
BERNARD L. STEWART  
LTC, SigC  
Commanding

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SCCPV-FG-OP (15 May 1971) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th  
Signal Battalion Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCSCS.  
FCR-65(R-3)

DA, Headquarters, 12th Signal Group, APO 96349, 20 May 1971, RCSCS

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington D. C. 20310

Commanding General  
1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)  
ATTN: SCCPV-FG-OP  
APO 96384

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15, and 1st Signal Brigade Supplement 1 to AR 525-15, 15 March 1971.
2. This Headquarters has reviewed the report and concurs with the following comments and or exceptions:
  - (a) Par h (15) Esach should read Esach. TCC-28 should read TTC-28.
  - (b) Par h (16) TCC-28 should read TTC-28.
  - (c) Par l, Sub Par J, training subjets should read subjects.
  - (d) Par 2 Lessons Learned, Sub Par (2) (b) first sentence MOS 52B should read MOS05B.
  - (e) Par f, Logistics, Sub Par (1) (a) equipmnt should read equipment.

  
PHILLIP E. LOWRY  
COL, SigC  
Commanding

SUCPV-OP-CG (15 MAY 71) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 37th Signal Battalion  
(Spt) Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GSFQR-65 (R3)

DA, HQ, 1st Signal Brigade (USASIRATCOM), APO 96384 JUN 20 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters has reviewed the report and concurs in it as indorsed with the following comments:

a. Reference pg. 2, para 1.e. Replacement personnel are assigned to the groups based on total authorization of the Groups. Comparison strengths of the 12th Signal Group and the 1st Signal Brigade for the stated MOS are as follow:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>12th Sig Gp</u> <u>Auth/Asg</u>	<u>1st Sig Bde</u> <u>Auth/Asg</u>
52B	53/60	208/243
63B/C	75/60	379/349
71B	36/36	357/348
71H	40/29	251/202
72B	233/185	1206/1070

b. Reference pg. 2, para 1.f. Under "GAINS", col should read: "24 (1 LTC, 1 MAJ, 11 CPT, 11 LT)".

c. Reference item, "Personnel", pg. 7, para 2.a. TAADS and BADS are initiated by individual units and forwarded through command channels. The individual unit, in order to be responsive to its changing missions, has the responsibility to initiate TAADS and/or BADS actions IAW 1st Signal Brigade Regulations 310-44 and 310-3.

d. Reference item, "Care of Generators", pg. 8, para 2.c.(2)(c). Non-concur. Starting and warm up time and procedures vary with each model of generator. The method outlined in the TM would be the appropriate method to use. 10KW generators were designed for extended periods of operation and will stand up to extreme heat, humidity and dust of Vietnam, providing they are set up, operated and maintained in accordance with the TM. The posting of "Close During Operation" on the shutters would be in error. Radiator shutters must be "OPEN" at all times during operation to allow air circulation to pass thru the radiator.

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NOT REPRODUCIBLE

SCGPV-OP-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 37th Signal Battalion  
(Spt) Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3)

e. Reference item, "Short supply of expendable supplies", pg. 10-11, para 2.h.(1)(c). Required items should be requested regularly and not in small quantities frequently. The established requisition objectives for expendable items and submission of demands on a regular basis will insure a continuous flow of supplies and would accomplish the same objective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*[Signature]*  
D. H. BUCKNER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CF:

Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command,  
ATTN: SCC-OPS-RT, Ft Huachuca, Arizona 85613  
Commanding Officer, 12th Signal Group, APO 96349  
Commanding Officer, 37th Signal Battalion, APO 96337

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

AVHDO-DO (13 May 71) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters, 63rd Signal  
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 31 JUL 1971


THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications  
Command-Pacific, APO 96557

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 63rd Signal  
Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
63rd Sig Bn  
1st Sig Pde

  
H. L. CHILDRESS  
CPT AGC  
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

SCCP-OP-00E (15 May 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th  
Signal Battalion (Spt), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS  
CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, US Army Strategic Communications Command-Pacific, APO  
San Francisco 96557 22 SEP 1971

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-  
FD, APO 96558  
Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications Command,  
ATTN: SCC-PO-CEFF, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ANN M. RIOU  
CPT, WAC  
Acting Asst AG

CF:

CG, USARV, APO 96375 wo incl  
CG, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384 wo incl  
CO, 12th Sig Gp (USASTRATCOM), APO 96349 wo incl  
CO, 37th Sig Bn (USASTRATCOM), APO 96337 wo incl

GPOP-FD (15 May 71) 5th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 37th Signal  
Battalion (Spt), Period Ending 30 April 1971,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 OCT 1971

THRU:

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mah*

M. L. MAH  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

SCC-PO-CEFF(15 May 71) 6th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 37th Signal Battalion  
(Spt), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Fort Huachuca,  
Arizona 85613

8 6 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), Washington DC 20310

1. Subject report forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters concurs with subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Keith W. Bell*  
KEITH W. BELL  
ALT, AGC  
Asst Adj Gen

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